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PART

7 AdjUStment to the consequences of state action

David Cohen*

SUING THE STATE

Introduction

As one examines the ways in which we have chosen to respond to claims of
individuals and firms to compensation from the federal administration,'
one is immediately struck by the rapid rate of growth in the number of
claims and the magnitude of the compensation that has been sought in

*

Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. I am indebted to John Frecker, who
provided me with the opportunity to develop the ideas articulated in this paper. 1
thank him for his invaluable comments, which have led to significant modification in
the ideas I have developed on government liability. I am also indebted to several
members of the conference, including William Bishop, Donna Greschner, Paul Craig,
John Hogg, Gerald Mashaw, Robert Prichard, and Katherine Lippell, whose comments
and criticisms of the paper were informative and constructive. Finally I would like to
thank Deborah Garvey and Kathleen Mell, who ensured the accuracy of the material
in the paper. The subject of this paper can legitimately comprise the entire range of
public policies which are designed and instituted as part of regulatory programs in an
effort to generate political support for the programs, to reduce public opposition to the
program, or to complement existing redistributive programs that might be adversely
affected by the proposals. There is no doubt that 'adjustment programs' of this sort are
of enormous financial and political import. However, they have been studied and
analysed in depth by a number of commentators, and though that debate informs what
I say here, I have little to add to that discussion. In this paper I address a slightly
narrower issue -how we might respond to losses incurred by firms and individuals as
a product of bureaucratic activity. While I tend to focus on compensation, I admit that
adjustment policies can include much more sophisticated and sensitive instruments.
1 I have chosen to use the term 'federal administration' rather than 'the Crown' or
'government,' or 'state.' By 'administration' I mean the institutions and resources
devoted to the design and implementation of policies and programs pursuant to federal
legislation. See Law Reform Commission of Canada The Legal Status of the Federal
Administration, Working Paper no. 40 (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada
1985). It reflects executive rather than legislative activity, although I recognize that the
two are not easily separable. It also avoids the use of the archaic and often-misleading
denomination of 'the Crown.' See F. MacKinnon The Crown in Canada (Calgary:
McClelland and Stewart 1976) 15. The description also avoids, at least at this stage of
the inquiry, the distinctions which the term 'Crown' creates among the governor
general, the cabinet, ministers of the Crown, individual (private) persons employed by
the Crown, Crown corporations and agencies, and so on. I have decided to focus on
the position of the 'federal' level of government because the limited information and
data available relate to that institution.
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recent years.' What is even more dramatic, however, is the shift in the
focus of our attention away from low-level bureaucratic activity, and
towards alleged administrative failures to ensure air traffic safety, combat
international terrorism, regulate financialinstitutions, protect the interests
of businesses in international trade negotiations, privatize the delivery of
goods and services, and design mass transit systems. It has become obvious
that regulatory activity and especially regulatory change almost always
costs us;3 compensation claims represent one response to regulatory
change, and the way we choose to respond to those claims reflects our
attitudes to private property, individual rights, individual welfare, and
collective action.
One might posit three distinct phenomena that have combined to
produce these developments. First, untiljust after the Second World War,
our legal system only imperfectly recognized claims against the administration.Judicial ideas derived from Dicey meant that one could sue individual
bureaucrats to obtain compensation for losses incurred as a result of their
individual activities, and presented only a limited avenue for redress. The
current situation may reflect the typical lag between the formal introduction of legislation and the appearance of its consequences as we interpret
the ambiguous ideas contained in it. Second, public bureaucracies have
become increasingly active in what were previously considered private
markets. The delivery of public services directly by public bureaucracies
and the increased involvement of the administration in regulating market
activities creates enormous potential for claims that the regulatory benefit
was delivered inadequately if at all. Finally, one recognizes what might be

The statistics on both of these topics at the provincial and federal levels of government
are notoriously incomplete. For example, a senior policy adviser in the federal
government has estimated that the contingent legal liability of the federal government
was $3 billion at the start of 1988. However, this statistic ignores both the 'non-legal'
compensation mechanisms now operating in the federal government and the exclusion
of claims which either are not cost-justified or do not track private legal rights and are
thus not cognizable within the current system. One analysis of the experience in Britain
suggests that 'far more money' is distributed through compensation programs than
through the tort system, at least in part because of the expansion in the categories of
'losses' which would never be allocated to it by the law of torts. See C. Harlow
Compensation and Government To& (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1982) 117. Recent
studies in Ontario suggest that perhaps l o per cent of the total amount of compensation paid out under compensation programs was allocated through the private tort
system. See Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Insurance (Toronto: Ministry of
Financial Institutions 1986) 61. The only analysis of the current system at the federal
level does not even attempt to generate the statistical information one would want. See
M.S. Kalson 'Federal Compensation Schemes' (1988) 4 Admin. LJ 1 2 .
3 In this paper I examine what might be called 'second order' effects of regulation,
which refers both to the unintended negative consequences of public programs and to
the foreseeable but undesired costs of implementing those programs. I exclude an
analysis of judicial review of deliberate redistributive activity.
2
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called an 'entitlement mentality' -persons who perceive a private claim
against the administration believe that all they need do is articulate the
claim coherently and through the appropriate institutional processes, and
the claim will be recognized. One does not need to go much further back
than 1965 to discover that the idea that individuals have rights to
government benefits represents a radical shift in liberal rights theory.4
Our responses to administratively generated losses have largely
employed the courts and legal processes to define and allocate entitlements,5 and in this paper I address a central question in designing
adjustment policies: should we transpose institutions and solutions which

4 Charles Reich developed this thesis in 'The New Property' (1964) 73 Yale LJ 733.
Reich's argument that individuals have property rights to wealth which has been
defined and allocated by the government through public programs is a radical
transformation of traditional liberal ideas about property as 'an individual right to
exclude others from the use or benefit of something.' See C.B. Macpherson 'Liberal
Democracy and Property' in A. Kontos (ed.) Domination (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press 1975).
5 There are several rudimentary systems now in place within the federal government
which augment civil liability. Space does not permit me to analyse or evaluate fully the
non-tort compensation systems. These include the Ex Gratia Payments Order, 1974,
which provides for the payment of public funds for losses or expenditures 'when it is
appropriate as a wholly gratuitous act of benevolence done in the public interest ...
although there is no liability on the part of the Crown to do so.' The distinguishing
characteristics of these payments include the denial of legal liability and the lack of
formal, rule-based decision-making processes. In 1978, $4,5oo,ooo was paid out
pursuant to the order, but from 1980 to 1983 payments decreased from $1,40o,ooo to
$833,000. A second compensation mechanism is 'nugatory payments,' defined in the
Public Accounts instruction manual as 'payments for which no value or service has been
received by the Crown but for which a liability is recognized by the Crown.' The third
compensation mechanism is the internal bureaucratic pre-review or pre-compensation
settlement process. T o the extent that a settlement process works effectively, it can
render external review institutions unnecessary. Moreover, since the vast majority of
claims will be reviewed in a pre-compensation administrative process, the operational
effectiveness of all policies will be determined there. Finally, we should acknowledge
the existence of statutory compensation mechanisms which operate outside of tort law.
Our current understanding of the operation of ex gratia nugatory payments and the
settlement process within government is admittedly rudimentary. While the theoretical
advantages of these internal administrative compensation programs include flexibility,
a reduction in administrative costs, and the compensation of interests that would not
be recognized in the current common law of tort, very little is known about the
interaction of these systems with the civil liability of the government. The development
of adjustment policies must be predicated on an understanding of the experience of
the federal government with these mechanisms, focusing on the administrative process
through which compensation claims are made, the identity of the potential and
successful claimants, the number and amounts of claims, the expressed and actual
criteria developed in the bureaucracy for determining the outcome of claims, the
degree of centralization or decentralization of the claims process, the degree of
publicity surrounding the process, the question whether the existence of the program
and the relevant criteria for the allocation of funds are known to the public, the review
mechanisms used within the bureaucracy, and the interests recognized through the
allocation of public resources to private citizens through these mechanisms.
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provide the framework for private ordering to administratively generated
losses? If we answer that question in the negative and reject the 'private'
law model, we face an enormous range of issues that must be addressed in
thinking about adjustment policies. One seminal issue that has to be
resolved in developing any coherent response to administratively
generated injury involves defining those aspects of human welfare that
should count in whatever adjustment policy we develop.

Adjustment policies, equality, and constitutionalism
Before one can begin thinking about adjustment policies to state action,
one should recognize that adjustment policies and delivery systems will, if
they interfere with vested rights, generate substantial constitutional
challenge. The development of 'non-legal' adjustment policies will be
severely constrained by constitutional limitations on policy development
that begin with the unquestioned assumption that the administration (or
the Crown, asjudges archaically interpret it) should be treated as a private
firm.
One might have thought otherwise in the light of recent decisions -in
particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in City of
Kamloops v. ~ i e l s e nin
, ~which the question of government responsibility
was addressed in a radically different manner from 'private' tort liability.
The case represents a deliberate decision that the regulatory activities of
public bureaucracies should be subject to compensation policies. This
development has been accompanied by equally important shifts in the
treatment of property claims,7 and of compensation for economic
e~~ectations.~
These cases contain the seeds of an important redefinition of the way in
which we have regarded government activity. This redefinition moves
away from models that have assimilated the government to the position of
a private firm, and represents an attempt to create a new model of

6 [1984] 2 SCR 2 , aff g (1981) 129 DLR (3d) 1 1 1 (BCCA)
7 Recently the Supreme Court of Canada in The @en in Rightof British Columbia v. Tener
(1985) 17 DLR (4th) 1 awarded compensation where mineral rights had been devalued
as a result of modifications of park legislation by the British Columbia government.
8 In several cases the courts have applied concepts of 'usual or apparent' authority to the
administrative activities, thus exposing the government to liability where bureaucrats
did not have authority to commit public funds. See J.R. Vewault et Filr Lid. v. AttorneyGeneral for Quebec [ig77] i SCR 41 ; Tramworld Shipping v. The Queen [ig76] 1 FC 159
(FCA).
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government liability. 9 These developments, however, are challenged by
Charter decisions, which apply equality concepts that ignore profound
differences between administration and individual, and which lead to
suggestions that the government should be treated like a private firm.'"
Equality concepts, like so many liberal ideas, point in two contradictory
directions. The first incorporates an explicit rule of law ideology, and
reflects a concern with the 'most objectionable feature' of rules providing
for special treatment of the government. " Here, equality means that
adjustment policies should reflect the equal treatment of the government.
The administration, at least when it is situated similarly to private firms,
should be treated in a similar fashion. It is that idea which supports
constitutional arguments that the government should not be afforded
special privileges unavailable to private firms. '*
Another conception of equality points us towards the equal treatment of
individuals, reflecting a concern that individuals share equally in the
benefits and risks of social and economic regulation and development. The
principle that no one should be exposed to egregious sacrifice for the
public good will play a central role in developing adjustment policies. An
appreciation of the development of communities as vehicles to ensure and
facilitate sharing conceives the community as a form of social ordering
through which members can participate in sharing the losses experienced
by others. We can exist as individuals and achieve our potential as

g See also Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1 (HC Aust.) at 26-7, where
the liability of a public agency carrying out regulatory responsibilities required an
adjustment to the common law principles of negligence.
l o Dickson cjc said in R. v. Eldorado Nuclear: '[The doctrine of Crown immunity] seems
to conflict with basic notions of equality before the law. The more active government
becomes in activities that had once been considered the preserve of private persons, the
less easy it is to understand why the Crown need be, or ought to be, in a position
different from the subject.' (1984) 8 ccc (3d) 449 (scc). Another example is Anm v.
Merton London Bo~oughCoum.1 [1g78] AC 728, [1g77] 2 WLR 1024, [1977] All ER 492
(HL), which begins with the assumption that private tort law ought to be applied to
governmental activities.
1 I See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on The Recovely of Unauthorized
Ditbursements of Public Funds (Victoria: Ministry of the Attorney General 1980) 13.
12 Chief Justice Dickson's statements in Eldorado Nuclear are supported by section 15
equality-rights decisions striking down the exclusive jurisdictional privileges of the
federal administration established in section 17 of the Federal Court Act. See Zutphen
Bros. Construction Ltd. v. qrwuiag System International Canada U d . (1987) 76 NSR (2d) 398
( ~ s s c )leave
;
to appeal to scc granted. As well, specific limitation provisions applicable
to governments in civil actions have been declared unconstitutional. See Streng et al. v.
Winchester (1986) 37 CCLT 296 (Ont. sc). This point has been extensively litigated in the
United States with conflicting outcomes. See Reich v. State Highway Dept. 194 NW 2d 700
(1972) (60-day notice of claim provision held unconstitutional); Fritz v. Regents of
Universiq of Colwado 586 P. r d 23 (1978) (notice of claims provision upheld as
furthering legitimate state interest in investigating claims promptly).
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autonomous beings only if there is a social community in which we
participate. Part of the reason we live together is so we can assist one
another when we suffer losses as a result of events over which we have little
or no control.
This notion of community, and of individual responsibility for the
welfare of others, finds expression in decisions providing compensation
when law enforcement activity results in losses by property-owners, and in
responding to personal injury claims when public health measures result
in injury to children who participate in public immunization programs. '3 The community benefits as a result of the individual's sacrifice, and egalitarian ideals suggest that the loss should be shared equally
across the cornm~nity.'~In a sense, we can understand the concept as
a reflection of ex post equal protection -that state action cannot arbitrarily discriminate among members of the public.'5
These constitutional decisions,which focus on the equal treatment of the
government, present difficult practical obstacles to policy reform. Yet I
cannot see how adjustment policy that responds to administrative action
can ignore that the actor is the federal administration! Appeals to formal
equality cannot avoid the intractable, highly contentious, and overtly
political character of an evaluation of the current system of government
liability and the design of alternative adjustment policies.'6 As Peter
Schuck wrote, 'If we would design ajust and effective system of public tort
remedies, we must first ask ourselves how we wish to be governed?"7 Yet
even this represents a severely circumscribed view of the exercise. Asking
how we wish to be governed represents the problem of defining and
delimiting the role of the modern Canadian state and public bureaucrats.
Assuming that we can achieve some consensus on that point (a highly

13 See Lapiewe v. Attmqr General of Quebec (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 554 (SCC),dismissing an
appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal, 7 DLR (4th) 37, which had allowed an appeal
from the Quebec Superior Court [ig7g] Que. sc 907. The Quebec decisions as weU as
the Civil Code perhaps incorporate an idea articulated in article 13 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, 1789: 'For the maintenance of the forces of law and order and
for the expenses of administration a general contribution is indispensable; it must be
equally shared among citizens according to their means.'
14 We have recognized this idea for centuries, although (not surprisingly) judges have
limited its applicability to land and perhaps property-like economic interests. T h e
interpretive rule has been justified on the ground that the burden of public action
ought to be borne by the community rather than imposed on a particular victim.
15 J.L. Sax 'Takings, Private Property and Public Rights' (1971) 81 Yale LJ 149
16 At the same time, if one wishes to raise formal arguments against government liability,
one need only turn to Justice Holmes's remarks in Kawanunukoa v. Polblank, 205 u.s.
349 (1907) at 353: 'A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but in the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.'
17 P. Schuck SuingGovernment (New Haven: Yale University Press 1983) i
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unlikely proposition, to say the least), we must still investigate how
adjustment policies might affect public bureaucracies. We must address
the ultimate question: how do we define the responsibility of some members of
the community to share resources with others? In the absence of a consensus
among Canadians as to the responsibility of the community and the role
of the state in defining that responsibility, the task of designing adjustment
policies if we choose to employ 'legal' instruments must be subject to the
same dialogue we experience in answering these questions in the political
arena.

Adjustment policies and human welfare
All of this brings us to the critical issue to which I alluded earlier.
Adjusting to administrative action requires that we draw distinctions
between aspects of individual and collective welfare-no workable liability
regime or compensation system, insurance program, or any other
adjustment policy can recognize all aspects of human welfare. Our choices
of the subset of interests (or 'rights,' if we use rights language and the legal
system to develop adjustment policies) must be subject to political debate;
'no scheme of rights and entitlements can plausibly claim to be neutral or
natural."' Indeed, even the preliminary decision to think in terms of
entitlements independent of their content cannot claim neutrality. The
choice, expressed in both federal and provincial 'Crown' liability legislation, to define a system of private legal rights against the federal administration is a product of history, reflects a belief in a specific theory of
human nature, and is predicated on a model of the proper role of the
community, government, and state.
Traditionally we have responded to administrative action by calling
aspects of human welfare 'rights and property,"g but there is no reason
to limit ourselves to rights-based adjustment policies. We can choose to
compensate for interference with physical liberty, to develop communitybased responses to personal physical injury, to establish entitlements to
legislative benefits, to protect traditional property rights recognized
between private individuals, to compensate for reductions in economic
welfare, to respond to psychological needs, to offer re-education and
retraining programs, to fund community programs, and so on; and those
choices are based on a normative order that must be articulated and
justified.

18 See A. Hutchinson and P.J. Monahan 'The Rights Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond'
(1984) 62 Tex. LR 1477.
ig See L.C. Becker Prop@ Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Boston: Routledge and K. Paul
'977).
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Even a cursory review of the development of government liability in
Canada indicates that very different interests have been recognized and
protected over time.'" Historically, the administration was afforded
complete immunity from any general liability to compensate for private
losses. T h e only exceptions to this immunity were personal liberty and
property rights. Initially, physical liberty was protected through actions for
false imprisonment applied against the police." Ownership rights have
been protected over time through a variety of vehicles, including common
law trespass actions against public officials as well as the 'Crown,"'
direct actions against the government for property takings,'3 and the
interpretive fiction of 'implied rights of compensation' in the case of
legislative action expropriating p r ~ p e r t y . ' ~Later, real property rights

Of course, it is misleading to separate an analysis of the interests we protect from the
context in which we protect them. Most government activity, and certainly all the
government activity in which I am interested, benefits some people and hurts others,
directly or indirectly. The range of interests that the law protects is often not nearly as
interesting as the range of situations in which the law protects those interests, and the
type of protection it affords. (I discuss this more fully below.) Furthermore, an analysis
of the interests we protect from state action must be augmented by an analysis of the
classes and individuals who benefit from such protection. Even a cursory examination
of the current liability regimes and compensation programs indicates that a relatively
circumscribed group of individuals is likely to receive a disproportionate share of public
funds.
21 See Davis v. Russell (1829) 5 Bing. 355, 130 ER 1098 (Ct. of Common Pleas). Recent
examples of this claim include Oag v. Canada (1987) 2 FC 51 I (FCA) (action for false
arrest and imprisonment on deprivation of freedom while on parole).
2 2 See Semayne's Case (1604) 5 CO. Rep. 91, 77 ER 194 (KB); Entick v. Cam'ngton and Three
Others (1765) ig St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. K B 275, 95 ER 807 (KB).
23 E.M. Borchard 'Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI' (1926) Yale LJ 1, at 16. The
idea was extended to permit recovery of personal and real property that had been
unlawfully seized by the government. The leading case is Massein v. R. [1g34] Ex. CR
223. See also Deeks Sand &Gravel Co. Lid. v. The Queen [1g53] 4 DLR 255, 10 WWR ( n . ~ . )
77 (BCSC);
Esquimalt UNanaimoR. Co. v. Wilson (1920) 50 DLR 371, at 374-5, [1g20] AC
358, at 364 (JCPC); G.S. Robertson The Law and Practice of Civil Proceedings, by and
against the Crown and Departments of the Government (London: Stevens 1908) 330.
24 There is a rebuttable presumption that the government will pay compensation for any
taking of property even though the taking is authorized. Traditionally, this 'presumption' was used to protect traditional real property rights. However, several recent
decisions have expanded protection to 'economic expectations,' but only to economic
expectations associated with corporate investment opportunities. See Manitoba Fisheries
Lid. v. The Queen [1979] 1 SCR 101, 88 DLR (3d) 462, and Tenersupra note 7. A recent
example of a case in which the court refused to apply this idea in the light of the
demonstrable redistributive objective of the legislative program was British Columbia
Medical Association v. R. in Right of British Columbia et al. [1985] 2 WWR 328 (BCCA) in
which the court rejected doctors' claims for compensation when the government
unilaterally altered the payment terms of the medical services plan.
20
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were recognized through nuisance concepts and trust doctrines.'5
Analogous and subsidiary economic and proprietary interests have been
recognized through the tort/property actions of conversion and detinue
and through restitutionary claimsz6 And, of course, beginning in the
early nineteenth century, comprehensive programs to define and allocate
compensation for expropriation of real property claims were introduced. '7
Governments have been uniformly unsuccessful in defending takings,
nuisance, or negligence actions involving property entitlements in cases
where they justify their actions on utilitarian or wealth-maximization
grounds. Judges simply refuse to recognize the legitimacy of arguments
that the administration considered its activities to be in the best interests
of the community, or that its activities were wealth-maximizingin the light
of an assessment of alternative courses of a ~ t i o n . ' ~
Later, protection was expanded to economic - that is, contract expectations; '9 recently non-contract economic interests also have been
protected from administrative action. Tort claims have been expanded to
permit recovery of economic losses associated with the negligence of public
bureaucracies.sO Property concepts have been extended to include the

25 Managms of the Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hilland Others (1881) 6 App. Cas. 193 (PC);
Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy (1874) LR 7 HL 243; Penn v. Lord Baltimwe (I 750)
I Ves. Sen. 453, 27 ER I 132 (Ch.). (court would recognize and enforce trusts against
the Crown)
26 Both concepts were developed to permit recovery of property and money in possession
of the government without authority. See Masskn v. R. supra note 23.
27 See E. Todd 'The Mystique of Injurious Affection in the Law of Expropriation' (1967)
UBC LR 127, at I 3 I ; Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & g Vict., c. 18.
28 See Scarborough Golf C9 Cuunhy Club v. City of Scarborough ( I 986) 28 DLR (4th) 32 1 (Ont.
HC) at 364-5; Mayw, Councillws, &Citizens of Hawthorn v. Kannuhik [1go6] AC 105 (PC);
Northwood v. Township of Raleigh (1882) 3 OR 347 (Ch. D.); Joh~zronet al. v. Town of
Dunah [1g45] 4 DLR 624, at 640 (Ont. HC).
29 However, the treatment of contract claims against the state is not as simple as it might
first appear. Only contract expectations derived from exchange relations with the
government were recognized as compensable interests. Moreover, contract claims were
limited to debt actions - the recovery of money loaned to the Crown (see The Bankeri
Case (1700) 14 HOW.St. Tr. I (Ex.)) and the recovery in contract for payment for
goods supplied to the Crown (see Feather v. The Queen (1865) 6 B . & S. 257, 1 2 2 ER
I 191 (KB). In a sense, both these actions represented property claims against the state,
and not until Thomcls v. The Queen (1874) LR 10 QB 31 were property concepts extended
to the right to recover unliquidated damages in contract.
30 However, the courts, in labelling a particular action as an operational rather than a
policy decision, have focused on the kind of losses suffered by the plaintiff. Where the
claim is for personal injuries and perhaps property damage, it is more likely that the
court will decide that the activity is 'operational' in character than if the claim is for
economic losses. However, no factor is determinative, and many personal injury claims
have been denied on the ground that the activity that gave rise to the injury was a
policy decision: see Williams v. St. John et al. (1984) 24 MPLR 15 (NBQB); Houle v. Calgaly
et al. (1985) 28 Alta. LR (2d) 331 (cA); Gerak v. R. in Right ofBritish Columbia (1985) 59
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present value of business operations that have been devalued as a result of
government decisions to compete with the private sector using government enterprises. 3' Recovery has been permitted of money paid to the
government pursuant to unauthorized statutory or regulatory provisi o n ~ . ~Judges
'
have expanded the concept of 'injurious affection' to
provide compensation to property-owners where land has not been
expropriated but has been devalued as a result of the construction or use
of public projects.33
The liability of governments for personal injury and property damage
claims is largely an invention of the twentieth century. Even here, however,
dramatic distinctions between the responsibility of private firms and those
of the government have been articulated through decisions to immunize

BCLR 273 (BCCA); Just V. R. in Right of British Columbia (1985) 64 BCLR 349 ( ~ c s c ) ;
Johnston v. Attwney-General of Canada (1981) 128 DLR (3d) 459, at 468 (Ont. HC);
Canadian Pacific Airlines v. The Queen (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 5 1 1, at 520 (FCA).
31 See Manitoba Fishmes Ltd. v. The Queen (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 462, [ig7g] i SCR 101
(compensations paid where federal government established Crown corporation with
exclusive right to engage in business previously carried on by private firm). However,
in Home Orderly Services Ltd. et al. v. Government of Manitoba (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 300
(Man. CA) compensation was denied where the provincial government decided to
withdraw financial subsidies from the purchasers of products or services and to provide
in-home health services without the involvement of private enterprises - the
replacement of the market with the direct government provision of social services. I n
that case, the court said that the expansion of a subsidized social service system to
replace private entrepreneurial activity would not necessarily give rise to compensation
of private enterprise unless 'the State damages or destroys a self-sustaining private
enterprise or private economic interest.' Similarly, in British Columbia Medical Association,
supra note 24, the British Columbia Court of Appeal denied compensation to doctors
whose income had been reduced as result of the enactment of legislation modifying
contractual commitments made between the government and the medical profession.
The court refused to call the contract expectations 'property.'
32 Until recently, money paid to the government 'voluntarily' under mistaken assumptions
as to one's legal liability to make the payment were not recoverable: a court would not
order the return of a payment made under a mistake of law. See Hydro-Electric
Commission of the T o m h i p of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 193 (SCC)
(money paid to Ontario Hydro where Ontario Hydro did not have the statutory
authority to demand the payment is not recoverable); C. Gordon Foster Development Ltd.
v. Landlqr (1979) 14 BCLR 29 (BCCA);
A.J. Seversen Znc. v. Village of Qualicum Beach (1982)
35 BCLR 192 (BCCA).However, in recent years several courts have said that if the
payment is made under 'practical compulsion' or if the demand for payment is coupled
with 'bad faith,' it will be recoverable. See Hydro-Electric Commission of the Township of
Nepean at 230; R. GOdd and G. Jones The Law of Restitution gd ed. (London: Sweet and
Maxwell 1986) 95-6.
33 Injurious affection claims arise 'when [losses are] caused to land by or in course of the
exercise of statutory powers [and] the owner must resort to the remedy, if any, which
is expressly or impliedly granted by the statute.' E.C.E. Todd The Law of Exp'opMtion
and Compensation in Canada (Toronto: Carswell 1976) 264.
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the government from responsibility when it exercises 'policy' functions.S4 Obviously, the argument that the government activity was a
'policy' decision and that the government is not liable to private citizens is
one that private firms are not entitled to make. T h e categorization of
decisions as 'policy' expresses several values, all of which recognize the role
of administrative actors in designing and implementing public p0licy.~5
T h e immunization of the administration from liability reflects an analysis
of the kind and range of discretion exercised by public bureaucrat^,^^
a concern with allocation of public resources, a consideration of the kinds
of interests protected from administrative action as well as the interests of
other potentially affected parties,37 an assessment of alternative redress
mechanisms, the availability of standards against which to assess the
government activity, an analysis of the status of the bureaucrat who made
the decision or engaged in the activity, and the articulation of an 'individualized' relationship between the administration and indi~idual.~'
Recently, arguments have been made that expectations of receipt of

34 T h e distinction was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v.
Nielsen supra note 6, after it had been articulated in A n m v. Merton London Borough
Council supra note lo. The distinction is also found in the Federal Tort Claims Act,
1947 and was discussed in Dalehite v. United States 346 us. 15 (1953).
35 D. Cohen 'The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem: Part 11'
[ig83-418 CBLJ 410
36 'Discretion' has no obvious meaning in this context. It may refer to authority to choose
between two alternative courses of action, to the exercise of specialized or professional
judgment, or to the formulation of policy through the balancing of competing public
interests through the application of criteria which courts should not and cannot
evaluate. See M. Aronson and H. Whitmore Public Tor& and Contracts (Sydney: Law
Book Co. 1982) 69. Others argue that the term ought to be limited to 'political'
questions, including, for example, a claim to damages by an unemployed person on the
grounds of 'negligent handling of the economy.' See S.H. Bailey and M.J. Bowman
'The Policy/Operational Dichotomy - A Cuckoo in the Nest,' (1986) 45 Camb. LJ 430,
at 439.
37 References to this idea can be found in Dorset Yacht Co. Lid. v. Home Office [ig70] AC
1004 (HL), where a line of nuisance cases was distinguished on the ground that the
interests at stake were much broader than those considered in the earlier cases.
38 In other words, the courts use the policy/operational distinction as a formal legal test
embodying a number of ideas that should be articulated and justified independently.
T h e concept is vague; it contains the seeds of a range of ideas which are too often
unarticulated, and it has led to conclusory reasoning. In the end, it is a simplistic,
formal test of liability which fails to disclose and thus subject to scrutiny several
important economic, political, and cultural ideas that underlie judicial intuition. For
example, it reflects an attitude of judicial deference to public bureaucratic discretion.
Yet there is rarely any debate as to the justification for deference or why it does not
apply when real property interests are at stake. At the same time the concept does
acknowledge that administrative action should not be assimilated to private action.
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economic and social welfare benefits should be protected from state
action.39 However, even this rudimentary development has not been
implemented by judges, and the ability to recover for the non-receipt of
regulatory benefits, if it ever existed, has been severely compromised in
recent years.4" The most recent developments relate to judicial recognition of at least some regulatory responsibilities through the application of
'
common law 'fiduciary' obligations against the g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ The
application of this concept to the government recognizes elements of
paternalism and public trust in the design and administration of public
policies. Again, however, the courts have limited the application of this
idea to cases where the government has assumed regulatory or supervisory
jurisdiction over the private 'property' of firms or individuals. 4' While

39 See D. Cohen and J.C. Smith 'Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence
in Public Law' (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. I . For all of the reasons I expressed earlier, it
is not surprising that in several recent cases the courts have denied government liability
to compensate private individuals for losses arising from the non-delivery or inadequate
delivery of public services (see, for example, fire protection services in Gordonna Ltd.
v. City of St John's (1986) 30 DLR (4th) 720, at 740 (NSCTD). TO recognize this aspect of
human welfare is to engage in redistributive justice, and mostjudges adhere to the idea
that political legitimacy to deploy wealth, at least through grants of money, has been
described as a 'constitutional' principle in Autkland Harbour Board v. The King [1g24] AC
318, at 336 (JCPC).
The requirement of parliamentary authorization for money to be
taken from the consolidated revenue fund encourages comprehensive discussion and
publicity, and reflects political concepts of democratic consent -in theory, it protects
the collective tax-paying public from unauthorized use. Of course, the actual deployment of wealth is usually articulated in program terms, and only rarely has it been
interpreted as conferring a right to receive the benefit as a particular individual.
Administrative decisions to allocate wealth have not attracted the degree or kind of
attention by the judiciary that decisions to allocate injury have.
40 Tlie Supreme Coun of Canada in The Queen in Right of Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat
Pool (1983) 143 DLR (3d) 9, [1983] SCR 205 held that a private firm, the Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool, need not compensate the government for losses simply because it failed
to comply with regulations under the Canada Grain Act regulating the delivery of
infested wheat. Thus, some courts have held that there is no longer a tort of 'breach
of statutory duty'; the implication of those decisions is that individuals cannot recover
damages when bureaucrats have not complied with legislation. See Gordonna Lid., supra
note 39.
41 The Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. R. (1985) 13 DLR (4th) 321 ordered the
federal government to compensate the Musquem Indian band for decades of losses that
were incurred as a result of the failure of federal bureaucrats to act in the band's best
interests in administering the band's property.
42 The majority judgment in Guerin made it clear that the fiduciary obligation was
predicated on private 'proprietary' rights of the Indians. The existence of and the
failure adequately to implement regulatory responsibilities arising as a product of
executive or legislative action were not the justifications for compensation.
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this idea can be used to enforce regulatory entitlements, the latter
requirement significantly limits its potential beneficiaries.43
But all of this simply represents my interpretation of the expanding
universe of interests protected under current legal regimes from
administrative action. T h e development of adjustment policies, whether
through 'government liability' or other instruments, must attempt to
articulate which interests ought to be recognized. The answer, which is
implicit in the federal and provincial 'Crown' liability legislation, appears
to be the simplest; the administration should be treated as a private firm,
with the concomitant outcome that all those individual 'rights' protected
from interference from private individuals are also protected from the
administration. Equally important is the implicit idea that no interests
other than those recognized between private individuals are protected.
There are several obvious difficulties with a policy that protects all of and
only those interests recognized as deserving protection between private
individuals. First, it fails to recognize that the administration is often
collectively empowered to redistribute wealth -to injure non-consensually.44 That is, liberal ideas that protect property and contract entitlements from administrative action have two implications. First, using
private law means that courts will not impose liability if the result would be
the redistribution of wealth from the 'state' and thus from taxpayers to
others. While property is restored or compensated for and contract
expectations recognized in both cases, one could assume that ex ante and
almost always ex post, public capital would not be reduced.45 Second,

43 This analysis of common law concepts that protect entitlements from administrative
action is obviously incomplete. T o understand fully the choices we make to compensate
individuals or to design alternative forms, we should analyse the broad range of
statutory schemes that define and create entitlements to compensation in specific
circumstances. Thus, the compensation program under federal expropriation
legislation must be analysed to assess its relationship to common law compensation
concepts. More important, we must analyse a broad range of statutory provisions which
provide for compensation in specific cases of government takings to determine their
relationship to common law compensation principles, and to evaluate the implications
of proposed reforms. As I pointed out earlier, that information does not exist.
44 The most obvious example of this is taxation, but the concept extends to all authorized
infringements of liberty or welfare. Even the current Crown Liability Act acknowledges
in section 4 6 ) that tort liability should not be imposed for acts that are legislatively
authorized.
45 This, of course, is consistent with a view of common law decision-making, which
incorporates the idea that the allocation and distribution of contract (and property)
entitlements should reflect corrective justice or perhaps wealth-maximization norms,
leaving the design and implementation of redistributive policies (if they are to exist at
all) to the taxation and social welfare systems of government. See F. Hayek The
Cotlstitution of Ltberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960) 93-102; R.A. Epstein
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the classes of persons contracting with the administration and owning
property that might be expropriated are such that public resources are
distributed only to a narrowly circumscribed subgroup of the general
population.
Similarly, treating the administration like a private firm represents a
refusal to recognize the benefit-gaining function of the modern welfare
state. The system cannot respond to losses generated through the delivery
of public goods or private goods through non-market vehicles. The
omission of public benefits and the protection of existing private property
rights has been driven by an implicit anti-redistributive, anti-majoritarian
ideology. The use of private law entails responding to administration
action by focusing attention on individual bureaucrats. Leaving aside the
symbolism of formal equality, that choice means that we have to ignore the
modern Canadian welfare state. Redistributing wealth and responding to
need through non-market institutions is and has been a central role of
Canadian governments since Confederation; it is a virtual prerequisite to
the development and implementation of all regulatory policy, and it does
not matter whether the redistribution is the objective or means chosen by
the government.
Finally, the use of legal liability as an adjustment policy implicitly assumes
that the idea of corrective justice should apply to the administration. It
incorporates normative assumptions which perhaps can bejustified in the
private law of tort and applies them to the government. Yet it makes little
sense, for example, to argue that the 'state as judge' ought to interfere as
little as possible with the liberty interest of private individuals -an idea
central to an understanding of tort law in private relations -in the context
of the administration as defendant. Both rule-of-law and constitutional
equality arguments develop from the same rhetorical and ideological
foundation, and both are used to support the assimilation of government
adjustment policy with private tort law.
Although it is consistent with the dispensing of (corrective) justice
according to law, this idea fails to answer several critical questions. It
presumes that concepts of formal equality provide us with the appropriate
definition of human welfare o r 'rights.' It purposefully ignores the values
that underlie judicialization and legalization of rights. It also ignores the
legitimacy of collective action implemented by public bureaucracies. T o say
that the protection of individual rights demands government liability is to
say the government ought to be constrained from acting and that

'Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal' (1982) 18 J. of Lawand Econ. 293; R. Nozick
Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974) 149-53; J . Rawls A Theory of
Jwtice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971) 87-8,
274-9
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individual rights as defined by judges must always prevail over the
collective good. Adjustment policies, unlike tort law, must reconcile the
tension between individual rights and the collectivity. It is naive to assume
that the interests we protect from interference by private individuals (and
only those interests) should without analysis be protected from administrative action.
If I am right in all of this, the expression and articulation of the subset
of 'essential'interests recognized in adjustment policies will reflect several
ideas that comprise and characterize the Canadian community. First, the
choice will always reflect the interests of the major actors who determine
the liability rules, and a decision to recognize more than private legal
entitlements, protect employment expectations and opportunities,
promote neighbourhood stability, ensure property values, and so on must
engage the communities that make up Canada in an effort to ensure that
those voices are heard. Second, the identification of those interests reflects
a concern with the redistributive impact of adjustment policies. In making
our choices we will be creating 'victims' of administrative action and we will
be redistributing wealth from some other group of individuals. Third, the
interests we choose to recognize will reflect utilitarian or wealth-maximization norms - public insurance and welfare programs have obvious
incentive effects on private behaviour, and adjustment policies must reflect
the impact of particular choices on private accident-generating and
In short, we must acknowledge the
accident-prevention mea~ures.4~
impact on private markets of the government activity associated with
private losses. Administrative action may exclude private markets
deliberately through the prohibition of certain activities, or, in a more
subtle manner, may drive out private activity. This displacement of private
markets, which has been referred to as 'general r e l i a n ~ e , ' ~may
' justify
compensation if the purpose of the regulatory activity is to replace the
market.4'
Utilitarian arguments can justify broadly based compensation policies
which reflect the idea that the aggregate utility of a group of individuals
may be increased by taking a small amount of goods and services from all

46 Instrumental arguments might suggest that we consider the administrative costs of
identifying, measuring, and responding to private losses; we should recognize
alternative institutional structures or vehicles through which the interest may be
recognized; and we might take into account the disincentive effects of providing
compensation on private activity.
47 See A n m v. Merton London Borough Council, supra note lo, at 500 (All ER); P.P. Craig
'Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power' (1978) 94 Law QR 428, at 45 I .
48 If compensation is denied, private market or insurance arrangements will to some
degree be regenerated, a cost that a priori was considered undesirable.
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individuals to compensate highly focused losses49 -that compensationbased adjustment policies, even if they have no effect on individual or
administrative behaviour, may reduce the consequences of losses through
loss-shifting arrangements. Here, adjustment policies are a mechanism
through which collective groups can bribe victims of collective action.
Centralized programs minimize the transaction costs otherwise associated
with organizing the collective group, and prevent free-rider problems.
This argument is strongest in the context of enterprise-individual and
thus administrative-individual relations. If the enterprise is 'owned' by
large numbers of individuals, we can assume that it will be less risk-averse
than the potential victim of its activities, and that welfare gains will be
generated by shifting the risk of injury from the potential individual victim
to the enterprise. The losses will be distributed across all private individuals who stood to gain from the deployment of those resources in their
next best use as defined by the administration. T h e disappointed potential
beneficiaries will be impossible to identify (they probably will not know that
they are victims), and the forgone opportunity to benefit from administrative action is likely to be perceived as less significant than the actual loss
suffered by the victim. If the losses are externalized by the bureaucracy
over time, then the welfare gains associated with the loss-spreading will
increase.5" These ideas have even broader implications when the
defendant is the community, and the loss-spreading mechanism is either
taxation or increases in the money supply.
Adjustment policies and bureaucratic incentives

But all of that is only a small part of the equation. Even if we were able, in
the abstract, to decide which aspects of welfare to recognize, we would still
have to consider their impact on bureaucratic conduct. The question of the
incentive effects of adjustment policies on bureaucratic behaviour is an
extraordinarily difficult one. T o a very large degree the instrumental
effect of our policies will depend upon the organization, function, and
purpose of the institution upon which it acts, and it is obvious that the
federal administration does not conform to one model of bureaucratic
organization. As well, the incentive effects of personal bureaucratic liability
and direct government liability are likely to be very different, and the
concomitant instrumental effects of permitting contractual shifting of

49 See M. Spitzer 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort' (1977) 50 So.
Cal. LR515, at 520.
50 Of course, those gains will be offset by an increase in the magnitude of loss perceived
by the 'insurers' who will pay out a portion of their existing wealth rather than simply
fail to receive some unknowable portion of state largess.
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losses within government or to insurers makes prediction that much more
difficult.
Moreover, if one assumes that government agencies and individual
bureaucrats are motivated to maximize social welfare, then liability rules
are both unnecessary and inappropriate regulatory instruments. Where
the bureaucracy is already accounting for both private and social costs in
its decision-making processes, using adjustment policies to force the
institution to internalize those costs simply generates increased administrative costs and will not alter regulatory behaviour.
The trivial regulatory impact of compensation claims is exacerbated
when the federal government does not procure market insurance in
respect of contingent tort liability, and thus does not face risk-related
premiums and is not subject to contractual regulation by the insurance
industry. And because a substantial proportion of regulatory benefits is
not distributed through competitive markets, liability costs will not be
passed on to the community through increases in product prices5' and
will not generate concomitant reductions in rates of product usage and
thus exposure to risk. Whatever incentives financial risk have in the private
sector, they are unlikely to operate in the same fashion in public institutions.
I am not certain that the analysis changes even if one assumes that
administrative decision-making is not socially optimal. The administrative
action, either because of incompetence or self-interest, is one that we
would not make again, given accurate knowledge of its implications. There
are strong arguments that the 'public interest' view of bureaucratic
behaviour is simplistic, and that bureaucrats' motives include maximizing
their budgets, their personal job and income security, their power, their
professional prestige, and their personal wealth. T o the extent that this is
true the bureaucracy is actinglike a private firm, and should be faced with
both the private and social costs of its activities.5'

51 See A. Downs Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown 1967) 30. Downs points out that
bureaus should not be measured by market standards not only because input costs are
impossible to calculate, but also because there is no market on the output side. See also
G. Calbresi The Cost of Accidents (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970). and T. Ison
The Forensic Lottery (London: Staples P . 1967).
52 There is evidence that notwithstanding social-welfare-maximizing motives, bureaucracies underestimate social costs, and one purpose of liability rules may be to inform the
bureaucracy of the costs its activities are generating. Compensation awards may
influence state action if the bureaucratic decision-making process has a tendency to
discount social costs. Errors in estimating social costs have been referred to as 'fiscal
illusion' associated with state action in which the relevant state decision-makers fail to
take into account the social costs of their activities. See L. Blume and D.L. Rubinfeld
'Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis' (1984) 72 Cal. LR569, at 588-90;
L. Tribe American Constitutional Law (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press 1978) 458-9; L.
Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions' (1986) gg Ham. LRgr 1, at 567 et
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Adjustment policies that impose liability where the government engages
in 'commercial activities' or adopts enterprise models of organization
implicitly recognize this point. In these cases we might assume that at least
to some extent the government enterprise is maximizing its private
welfare, and thus will be discounting social costs. Using adjustment policies
to force the government to internalize social costs would appear to some
to be desirable. Allocating losses to the administration is theoretically
defensible if the externality is a result of bureaucratic decision-making that
emphasizes budgetary costs, notwithstanding a policy that is designed to
take into account all private (bureaucratic and political) and social (victim)
costs.='
Even when the government is acting in a self-interested profit-maximizing fashion, or is exploiting its independence from its 'principal,' or is
simply 'negligent,' the imposition of economic sanctions, without more,
will not generate positive regulatory responses. The strongest argument
against using adjustment policies to force the administration to internalize
losses recognizes that the administration is far less likely than private firms
to be constrained by competitive capital and product markets, and thus can
shift costs to the general public through taxation policy. If this is so, then,
even assuming that loss-shifting is desirable, the institutional characteristics of central governments permit the externalization of costs even if we
would want to shift them to the 'government.'
The costs may be borne by another department, a bureaucracy independent from the one whose actions are most directly associated with the
i n j ~ r y . 5Many
~
bureaucratic decisions are results of a complex series of

seq. While in a perfect world the bureaucracy may take into account all the social costs
of its activity, reality may be quite different. This may be because those costs do not
come out of the bureaucratic budget, or because the bureaucrat calculates costs not in
terms of willingness to pay to avoid the state activity, but in terms of 'political costs.' In
that case the costs may not be related to the preferences of the members of the relevant
community. One should keep in mind, however, that full compensation is appropriate
in this context only if there has been full government failure. If there has been only
partial government failure, then only partial compensation is appropriate. What is
critical to a full understanding of the issue from this perspective is to identify the cases
where 'fiscal illusion' is likely to be taking place, and to measure the magnitude of the
failure.
53 See the Treasury Board of Canada's administrative policy manual, Benefit-Cost Analysis
Guide (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1976), chapter 490 ('Socio-economic
Impact Analysis'), which directs bureaus to identify and calculate all costs and benefits
associated with proposed regulatory action.
54 The separation in the government of the 'acting' department and the loss-bearing
department will depend on the particular way in which economic signals are structured.
If the signals are received by the correct department, and if the departmental budgets
do not permit loss-shifting over time, we might predict modification of administrative
activity at the institutional level. See Cordes and Weisbrod 'Government Behaviour in
Response to Compensation Requirements' (1979) J. of Pub. Econ. 47.
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interactions among individuals and institutions, and only very carefully
designed adjustment policies will prevent externalization as a result of the
inability of the reviewing institution to allocate costs precisely on a
proportionate basis to the correct sector of the government.55 A solution is to allocate the costs against the government, expecting the government, which has a comparative informational advantage, accurately to
allocate the costs to the appropriate ministry, department, sector, or
individual. Although this is theoretically appealing, if the government is
motivated to shift the losses to the community rather than to a specific
bureaucracy, the problem continues. And if it is not, then adjustment
policies are not needed to make it act that way. Unless public bureaucrats
are independently motivated to monitor the activities of their subsidiary
bureaucrats, ascertain the welfare losses associated with administrative
action, and take appropriate measures, the loss will remain external to the
administration. Governments motivated to act in this fashion will do so
without being 'signalled' by the economic impact of adjustment policy
liability risks.
Adjustment policies and the many faces of LRviathan

Even if we were able to resolve all of these questions, talking about the
aspects of individual and collective welfare to be responded to assumes that
they would be the same across all administrative activities. Given the
enormous range of regulatory activities of modern governments, that
assumption appears to be unworkable. Leviathan is not a monolith, and
adjustment policies must be sensitive to the enormous range of institutional structures and programs that characterize the modern Canadian state.
The administration provides information to the public to influence tastes
and values, correct market dysfunction, and reduce transaction costs. It
regulates information that private firms disseminate or keep undisclosed.
It regulates the prices charged for a variety of services and goods which it
provides directly through public enterprise or through private firms. It
regulates the quality and quantity of goods and services through certification, testing, registration, and licensing programs, as well as through
subsidies and taxes. It provides a range of insurance, welfare, and
compensation programs to the public generally and to discrete subgroups

55 Certainly the problem has been recognized in the corporate context. See Note
'Decision-Making Models and the Control of Corporate Crime' (1976)85 Yale LJ 1091;
C. Stone Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York:
Harper and Row 1975). The problem has also been recognized in the case of
administrative action. See Law Reform Commission of Canada The Legal Statw of the
Federal Administration Working Paper 40 (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada
1985) 7-1.
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of the population. It provides both private and public goods directly to the
public, including health care, transportation services, and national
defence, and may in some cases prohibit private enterprise from engaging
in competition with it. It redistributes wealth through tax policy. My
intuition is that a universal adjustment policy could not respond optimally
to losses generated across this range of regulatory activities, and even a
brief analysis of three areas of administrative action that have generated
claims to compensation in recent years confirms that idea.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

One area of government operations that generates a substantial number
of losses is the criminal and civiljustice system and, in particular, the denial
of compensation to individuals who claim that they have been wrongly
convicted of criminal offences or incorrectly found to be liable to
compensate another in private lawsuits. We have preserved historical
immunities enjoyed by judges and Crown p r o s e c ~ t o r s , 5and
~ liability
will not be imposed for negligence or even for malice in the case of quasijudicial and judicial decisions.57
There are several obvious explanations for this phenomenon. First,
common law rhetoric may lead some to believe that judges who simply
discover the law through reasoning cannot be 'negligent' in any sense that
would permit judicial review for compensation to be differentiated from
an appeal on the merits of the decision. Second, the redistribution of
entitlements associated with judicial decision-making in this 'mediating's* context will often involve the definition of entitlements between
non-governmental actors, and does not represent a reallocation of wealth
to or from the state. Related to this idea is the naive view that prosecutorial
bureaucracies and the judiciary are not implementing a formal program.

56 Most 'Crown' liability statutes continue immunities for criminal and penal law
enforcement, and for activities involving the discharge of judicial responsibilities. See
Proceedings against the Crown Act, RSO 1980, c. 393. ss. a(a)(d),5(6). See Nelles v. The
Queen in Right of Ontan'o et al. (1986) 2 i DLR (4th) 103 (Ont. CA).In Nelles the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that at common law the attorney general as well as Crown
attorneys are immune from civil liability even for malicious prosecution. The Supreme
Court of Canada overturned the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on this issue,
holding that Crown prosecutors who act maliciously may be liable to compensate their
victims. However, the court preserved the historical immunities from liability in
negligence. See Nelles v. The Queen [lggg] 2 SCR 170.
57 See Sirros v. Moore [1975] QB 118 (cA); Mackenzie v. Martin [ig54] SCR 361. The
Canadian decisions parallel American and British policies. See Gregoire v. Biddle et al.
177 F . nd 579 (1949) cert. den. 339 U.S.949. The immunity in the United States has
been extended to deny prosecutorial liability even in the case of so-called constitutional
torts. See Imblw v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct 984 (1976) (prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity from civil liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
58 J. Sax 'Takings and the Police Power' (1964) 74 Yale LJ 141
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For both these reasons, concerns with bureaucratic self-interest which
might otherwise justify adjustment policies are attenuated. Further,
judicial and professional norms of conduct are likely to be powerful
regulators of behaviour, and thus our choices might reflect the view that
prosecutors and judges are 'regulated' by these norms of conduct, and
incentives created through threats of liability are less justified.59 As
well, the design of the judicial process is relevant; the identity of the
relevant state actors-judges and prosecutors-is easily ascertained, which
facilitates formal and informal internal re vie^.^" The number of
potential state actors subject to review is also relevant, since internal
bureaucratic review is unlikely to be overwhelmed by resource
demands. 6'
Justifications for prosecutorial immunities include protecting prosecutors from harassment by unfounded claims, conserving limited prosecutorial resources to be employed in law-enforcement activities, preserving
the 'independence of judgment' required in prosecutorial decisionmaking, recognizing post-conviction review procedures, including the
remedial power of trial judges and appellate review, employing criminal
proceedings against the prosecutor, and regulating prosecutorial conduct
through professional review and sanctions.

''

GOVERNMENT AS ENTERPRISE

Our responses to prosecutorial and judicial administrative errors can be
contrasted with the treatment of administrative action consisting of the
direct provision of services to the public - that is, cases where the
regulatory tool the state has chosen to use is direct participation in the
market. Judges have responded aggressively to situations in which the state
is engaged in commercial and 'business' activities and have treated the
government or its sub-agents as if they were a private firm in most
cases.Q

59 Some of these ideas are canvassed and criticized by M. Pilkington in 'Damages as a
Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' (1984) 62
Can. Bar Rev. 517, at 560-1.
60 In Richman v. McMurhyet al. (1983) 41 OR (2d) 559, 147 DLR (3d) 748 (Ont. HC)one
finds references to the alternative institutional processes through which prosecutors are
regulated.
61 See Everett v. GnJjfithc [ig2i] I AC 63 I (HL); O'Reilly v. Mackmun [1g82] 3 WLR 604 (cA),
affd [1g82] 3 WLR 1096 (HL).
62 These ideas are canvassed in Nelles, supra note 56, at 122-4; Imbler v. Pachtman supra
note 57, at 991 (S. Ct); and Pearson v. Reed 44 P ad 592, at 597 (Dist. CA 1935).
63 This is one of the significant elements of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Welbridge Holdings Ud. v. Greater Winnipeg[lg71] SCR 957. where Laskin J, in dismissing
a claim for damages resulting from the enforcement of a subsequently invalidated bylaw, stated that a municipality, while it may enjoy immunities when exercising legislative
and quasi-judicial functions, will 'incur liabilities in contract and in tort, including
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It is obvious that adjustment policies that respond to compensation
claims where the government engages in market activities and delivers
programs and services through institutions organized like private
enterprises raise dramatically different issues than claims generated by
prosecutorial and judicial error. Whether the administration is competing
with private firms or chooses to replace private entrepreneurial activity
with a public monopoly, adjustment policies must be directed at two
categories of loss-generating activities. The first is represented by claims
by private firms for economic losses suffered as a result of the introduction
of an additional 'non-market' competitor; the second consists of claims of
firms that suffer losses as a result of the administrative activity as a
continuing process.
In the first case, adjustment policies might reflect the idea that the risk
of competition by the government should be analogized to competitive
risks generally, for which private firms are not compensated and which are
reflected in the rates of return on capital investment -in a sense, the firm
is compensated ex ante. Unless one thinks that pecuniary externalities
should be compensated for generally, or believes that government activity
is necessarily less desirable than private activity,it should be irrelevant that
the competition consists of the administration rather than private
enterpri~e.~4
This approach views the administration as a private firm
and argues for compensation in the same circumstances in which a private
firm would be obliged to compensate. 65
The question of 'intra-activity' adjustment policies can be analysed along
the same lines. If the administration is acting as a firm, and if we believe
that wealth-maximization norms argue for the establishment of property,
contract, and tort entitlements, the optimal 'adjustment policy' for
administratively generated losses would seem to be whatever system we

liability in negligence ... [where] there may ... be an individualization of responsibility
for negligence in the exercise of business powers.'
64 If the state expropriates property, or makes it illegal to engage in an activity in order
to establish a monopoly, competition is not taking place, and this analysis would justify
compensation. This is the approach that was adopted in the Manitoba Fisheries case,
supra note 31, where the court held that the creation of a federal agency to market fish
and the resulting devaluation of the plaintiffs commercial enterprise constituted a
taking for the purposes of justifying compensation.
65 The argument that competition by the government constitutes unequal treatment
under section 15 of the Charter was recently rejected. See Sebastian v. Saskatchewan
(1987) l o CRD 475-03 (government promotion of public campgrounds does not
constitute unequal treatment of private campground owner who suffered business
losses as a result of advertising).

Heinonline - - 40 U. Toronto L.J. 651 1990

652

UNIVERSITY O F TORONTO LAW J O U R N A L

apply to private firms.66 This argument is strengthened if one assumes
that the administration, when it is producing and distributing goods
through corporate and market mechanisms, may not be accounting for all
of the exogenous costs of its activities, but rather may be motivated by
private wealth-maximization or utility-maximization objectives. Adjustment policies should be designed to restrain administrative action and to
ensure that the administration faces cost incentives analogous to private
While government failure may be characteristic of all
administrative activity, the fiscal illusion generated by the phenomenon is
likely to be more prevalent in state enterprise activities.
Adjustment policies analogous to those applicable to private firms should
also be implemented when the administration uses relatively independent
vehicles to engage in market activities. That is, when the government
establishes relatively independent economic units to deliver public services,
the economic organization of the public firm will permit 'regulation'
through economic incentives that are absent when the signal is directed at
general revenues. Moreover, our ability to articulate standards ofconduct
to regulate administrative conduct is likely to be enhanced when the
administration provides goods and services through market vehicles, an
activity with which we have considerable experience in the private sector.
The administration, when it engages in market activity, may be indistinguishable from private enterprise, and our sense of outrage associated
with inegalitarian treatment may be enhanced as the administratively
generated injuries become indistinguishable from private injuries; and the
private costs incurred in distinguishing the public firm from the private
will increase when the public firm is engaged in market activities. We may
interpret administrative choices to organize activity through markets and
enterprise arrangements as a signal that a political decision has been
reached to have that activity subject to market constraints, and thus subject
to a regime that establishes property entitlements, exchange relations, and
non-consensual relations upon which market behaviour is based. Finally,
the public enterprise may be organized so that the beneficiaries of the
administrative activity bear a proportionate share of the costs of that
activity. Redistributional goals, which may justify non-compensation in
situations involving implicit taxation and subsidy decisions, are replaced
by objectives that may justify compensation. The 'insurance program'

66 Sax, supra note 58, 63-7, argues for this approach when he suggests that compensation should be payable when the state is acting as an enterprise organization. This
analysis does not offer any insights, however, as to whether special additional
responsibility is justified, or whether one should design alternative policies where the
state firm is not simply maximizing its net expected profits, but is motivated by social
welfare objectives.
67 Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 52, 573, 620-2
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established through adjustment policies is thus funded by the class of
persons exposed to the risk rather than by the public at large.
GOVERNMENT AS INFORMATION BROKER

The final confirmation of my suggestion that adjustment policies must be
context-dependent involves an assessment of our response to losses
generated by the administration when it distributes information about its
own or private activities. The motivations for informational programs are
varied, and it is clear that liability rules must be sensitive to the context of
and rationales for state action in cases where the provision of information
causes private losses.
One obvious rationale for information-disclosure programs is the
correction of market dysfunction by reducing private search, uncertainty,
and mistake costs. When markets underproduce i n f ~ r m a t i o n , ~the
'
government may choose to regulate the information-generating activities
of private f i r m ~ , ~or
g the administration may choose to provide it
directly in government information programs. Both cases represent
relatively low-cost, non-intrusive regulatory instruments.
Regulatory programs which direct private firms to disclose information
may result in a range of private victims who are identifiable as a class in the
regulatory action and as individuals in the case of private lawsuits. Where
the government obliges private firms to disclose information, the
administrative action involves both restrictions on liberty on the firm and
mandatory transfers of wealth to the recipient of the information. Even if
the information is accurate, firms who were benefitingfrom the imperfect
information and transaction costs will lose wealth. If private firms were to
provide accurate information to the public, however, compensation would
not be payable, and we might ask why the administration should be treated
any differently. Where our regulatory objective is to create efficient
markets, we do so not by expropriating wealth, but by facilitating choice.
What 'expropriates' wealth is the consumer's change in taste, and the
concomitant inability of the 'victim' to exploit mistake and search costs. No
one believes that private competitive activity shouldjustify compensation,
and unless we think that state action reflecting changes in taste is different
68 Information may be underproduced because it is a public good, and producers
therefore cannot easily capture all of the demand that would be expressed in market
transactions. When adverse information is required to be disclosed, the private costs of
disclosure may exceed the private benefits associated with receipt of the information,
and it is likely that market participants will ignore the aggregate social benefits
associated with disclosure regardless of their magnitude.
69 Information disclosure, whether it originates in judicial, legislative, or regulatory
sources, is designed to impose direct and indirect costs on information providers: direct
costs are represented by expenses incurred in disseminating the information, and
indirect costs by demand shifts in response to the information.
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from private competition, adjustment policies should not be implemented
in this context.
However, a different analysis applies when the administration is
producing information about its own current or future behaviour. It is
obvious that a significant proportion of government information activity
is a product of its monopoly with respect to information about regulatory
programs and its own present and future activity. Here the administration
is engaged in activity that represents a self-correcting mechanism for its
monopoly on the information. Assuming the information is accurate, firms
which, if the state were to give access to the information, might operate as
information brokers incur losses represented by the forgone profits that
would have been available in the absence of administrative action. In other
cases the administration may disseminate information it believes ought to
be available to all members of the public without the discriminatory impact
of the market. Since the information is distributed at a zero price, the
program necessarily injures market participants who would otherwise
engage in the production of the information; and if the information is
accurate, compensation simply represents a cost of replacing market
information with public information and the decision to compensate will
reflect the willingness of government to incur the true social costs of public
programs.
Adjustment policies will be quite different, however, when the administration inadvertently or deliberately provides inaccurate information to
the public with resulting personal, property, or economic losses. The
information may be provided explicitly in information programs, in
individual responses to requests for information, or through the creation
of expectations of government behaviour associated with government
practices or conduct-generating reliance-based losses.7"
Here we have treated the administration like a private firm, using
negligence and contract doctrines to impose liability on individual
bureaucrats and public institutions.
Yet compensation may be an

70 See Sutherland Shire Council, supra note 9; see also E. Weinrib 'The Case for a Duty to
Rescue' (1980) go Yale LJ 247, at 258.
71 Generally, the courts have held that decisions of bureaucrats to disseminate information
to individual members of the public upon which the latter rely in planning their
economic activity will give rise to liability. See Cardinal Construction Ltd. v. Brockville
(1984) 25 MPLR 1 16 (Ont. HC); Grand Restaurants of Canada Ltd. v. City of Toronto ( 198 1 )
123 DLR (3d) 349 (Ont. HC); Windsor Moturs Ud.v. Dtstrict of Powell River(ig6g) 4 DLR
(3d) 155 (BCCA).See also Shoddock &Associates Pty Lid. v. Parramatta City Council [No.
I ] (1981) 36 ALR 385, 150 CLR 225 (HC Aust.) (city liable to firm that relied on
information regarding town planning proposals); Dubnick v. Winnipegosis [ig85] 5 WWR
758 (Man. CA) (laundromat owner recovered losses incurred in purchasing water where
city incorrectly informed him, six years earlier, that he could not drill well to obtain
water on property).
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inappropriate ~ o l i c yadjustment to government-produced inaccurate
information. Private entitlements -including an entitlement to accurate
information -may be protected by either liability or property rules. That
is, after deciding that private firms and individuals are entitled to accurate
information, we must decide whether to protect the entitlement through
compensation awards or through requiring the administration to act in a
particular fashion. Adjustment policies that focus on compensation reflect
a concern that if the government were committed to act consistently with
the information we would effectively be permitting low-levelbureaucratic
activity to trump legislative direction.7' Yet adjustment policies can
legitimately take into account the protection of investment decisions and
attempt to constrain administrative action through decisions that commit
the government to particular pr0grams.7~As well, process values might
justify preventing administrative action that is inconsistent with information provided by b~reaucrats.7~
All of this is further complicated when one recognizes that the administration may be disseminating information about its future activities,
policies, and programs, or perhaps about the economic implications of
regulatory action. If we respect the exercise of legislativechoice we should
be very careful about developing adjustment policies.75 At the same

72 Judges have refused to hold that the government is committed to act consistently with
representations that are beyond the authority of individual bureaucrats, or that would
result in unlawful actions. See Woon v. Minister of National Revenue [1g51] EX. CR 18;
Stickel v. Minister of National Revenue [1g7" I FC 672 (FCTD);reversed on other grounds
[1973] FC 259 (FCA),[1975] 2 SCR 233; Minister of National Revenue v. Inland Industries
Limited [1974] SCR 514. Representations by bureaucrats leading to irrevocable economic
losses will not give rise to an 'estoppel' against the government or its agencies; as one
judge put it, '[Alny commitment which the Commission or its representatives may give
... to act in a way other than that prescribed by law would be absolutely void.' See
Granger v. CEIC (1986) 69 NR 2 1 2 , at 215 (FCA)(information given that pension fund
could be transferred to a retirement plan without adverse tax consequences would not
prevent Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission from deducting benefits).
73 See Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1g48] 2 All ER 767 (KB); h e r (Finance) Ltd. v.
Westminister Corporation [1g70] 3 All ER 496 (cA).
74 See R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Preston [1985] I AC 835 (income tax
reassessment set aside as 'unfair' in that it constituted an abuse of process in light of
the inaccurate information given by IRC employees on which the plaintiff relied); HTV
U d . v. Price Commission [1g76] 1 CR 170; Sow-Ministre du revenu du Qdbec et Procureur
gbnhal de la province de Qdbec v. Transport Lessard (1976) Limitbe (28 August 1985,
Quebec CA) discussed in Granger, supra note 72, at 215 (claim for sales tax dismissed
on ground that it infringed rules of natural justice in light of information relied upon
by taxpayer regarding purchase of business); Secretary of State for the Home Dept ex parte
Khan [1g85] I All ER 40.
75 Several decisions suggest that the government will not be liable when it fails to disclose
future administrative or legislative activity: Laurie's Caterers U d . and McConville v. North
Executive Holdings U d . v. Swift Current
VancouverandJohnston (1985) 64 BCLR 134 (BCCA);
[1985] I WWR 341 (Sask. QB). Judges have used concepts of intention (Lethbidge
Colleries v. R. [1g5 I ] SCR 138;Joy Oil Co. U d . v. R. [ig5 I] 3 DLR 582 (scc); Administration
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time, we can respond to misinformation about current and existing
government programs through the development of non-compensatory
adjustment mechanisms. In fact the monopolistic characteristics of the
state as an information provider, and concerns with investment decisions
may justify compensation based adjustment policies even he^-e.76
Nonetheless adjustment policies which include compensation or which
attempt to direct administrative action will interfere with the dynamic,
environmentally-sensitive nature of administrative decision-making; and
to attempt to regulate administrative choices as to the most appropriate
timing of disclosure of regulatory activities is obviously problematical.
There may very well be valid reasons to compensate losses associated with
modifications in regulatory programs but we should not deceive ourselves
into believing that we are doing so in order to compensate for losses
associated with inaccurate information.

Thefutureof tort law
Our thinking about the interests we protect under current liability systems,
the ideas that might inform a decision to expand or contract those
interests, and my description of three administrative activities that
generate private losses suggest that adjustment policies must be department- and perhaps program-specific. Their design cannot possibly be
carried out without an examination of the ways in which specific departments and programs generate losses and an evaluation of the implications
of providingcompensation in some or all of these cases. We would want to

of Papua and New Guinea v. Leahy (1961) 105 C L R 6 ( H C ) ) ; agency and authority (The
Queen v. Trannuorld ShippingUd (1975) 61 DLR ( 3 d ) 304 ( F C A ) ;A-G Ceylon v. Silva [1g53]
AC 461 ( J C P C ) ; Comeau v. Province of New Bmnnuick (1973) 3 6 DLR ( 3 d ) 763 ( N B C A ) ) ;
prohibitions against fettering administrative discretion (Birkdale District Electric Supply
Company v. Corp. of Southport [1g26]AC 355 ( H L ) ; The Kingv. Dominion of Canada Postage
Stamp Vending Company Ud. [1g30] SCR 500); legislative supremacy (Winter v. City of
Saskatoon (1964) 47 DLR ( 2 d ) 53 (Sask Q B ) ; Re Galt-Canadian Woodworking Machinery Ud.
et al. and City of Cambridge (1982) 135 DLR (3d) 58 (Ont. H C ) ) ; and duty o f care (Winter
v. City of Saskatoon, and Re Galt-Canadian Woodworking) t o distinguish these cases from
others.
76 T h e N e w Zealand courts have recently expanded government liability to include
compensation for losses associated with reliance o n statements o f future government
policy. In Meates v. Attorney-General [1g83] N Z L R 308 ( C A ) Meates had relied o n
discussions with the Labour government regarding regional economic expansion
financial subsidies. T h e promised subsidies were not granted, and the court awarded
compensation. Senior government officials had given specific advice regarding the
application o f government policy in circumstances where they should have known that
their advice would be relied upon. It should be noted, however, that the court
recognized the legitimacy o f a 'free and effective' administrative system, and
acknowledged that the officials were not guaranteeing the subsidy but merely
undertaking t o act in a non-negligent fashion in attempting to fulfil their undertaking.
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know about the implementation of the particular program; we would
require information about the fiscal organization of the relevant bureaucracy; we would have to understand the mix of regulatory objectives which
the administration is attempting to achieve; we would require information
about the existing losses generated by the program or department (which
would require a broad-ranging study of its constituents to the extent that
they are identifiable to determine the ways in which their welfare is
adversely affected by departmental action); we would want to evaluate the
implicationsof various adjustment policies on individual bureaucratic and
institutional behaviour; we would have to explore the distributional
implications of the adjustment policy; and all of this would have to take
into account existing or alternative adjustment mechanisms. 77
So my original question -what aspects of individual welfare ought to be
recognized in designing adjustment policies? -cannot be answered in the
abstract. A solution that addresses the question in context will generate
policies that are appropriate within a severely circumscribed universe, but
that may bear no relationship to one another. And yet we want adjustment
policies that are coherent across programs and departments; therefore, we
must provide some general ideas to inform the debate.
Most of us agree that some category of 'essential interests' should be
protected from interference by legislative and presumably administrative
acti0n.7~We know that we cannot leave it to the majority to define those
interests, or to the bureaucracy, since they are precisely the groups from
which we are trying to protect the minority. It is relatively uncontroversial
to suggest that personal physical liberty and individual freedom from state
coercion in one's speech, thoughts, and religion are important liberal
democratic ideals.79 Similarly, non-arbitrary treatment incorporated in
process-fairness values and judicial institutions as part of the rule of law

77 Even if we were to resolve all of these problems, we would still have to consider
institutional design questions, which will significantly influence the delivery of the
program benefits. As well, adjustment policies must take into accounf the question of
political accountability for the appropriation and distribution of public funds. A system
that protects the interests of aggrieved individuals necessarily constrains the capacity
of government to manage public finances in a politically responsible fashion. What is
expended in adjustment programs is not available for other public programs. More
important, the reallocation of wealth may deteriorate into a zero-sum game, with
resources that are allocated to the claimant victim effectively denied to an invisible
member of the community who would otherwise have enjoyed the public benefit.
78 See R.A. Dahl A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press
1985) 15-16; and J. Fishkin Tyrannyand Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press
'979).
79 These, of course, conform to John Rawls's 'basic goods' as the minimum prerequisites
for personal freedom. See J. Rawls A Theory ofJwtice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press
of Haward University Press 1972) 92.
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can be explained in most liberal democracies as a reflection of a concern
with economic as well as psychological security.
There is, sadly, no agreement that the role of government is or should
be to secure individual and group well-being achieved through social
policies designed to meet basic needs such as food, health care, and shelter
-perhaps through guaranteeing a minimal level of income and education.
There is even less chance that one could articulate a consensus that the
community, through its government, provides the infrastructure for a
particular kind of economic system and should compensate, at least to
some degree, for the insecurities associated with it.'"
Such a consensus, even if we were able to interpret it, is so abstract as to
be unworkable for policy development. The modern 'welfare' role of the
Canadian government is subject to philosophical and political debate. Not
only is there debate over the obligation to redistribute resources so that
basic needs are ~atisfied,~'
there is also disagreement on the underlying
reasons for the provision of welfare. In the end, the 'essential interests'
that should be protected from administrative action will depend upon the
political ideology one chooses as defining the appropriate role of the
modern Canadian state.
Suppose, for example, we choose to adopt a minimalist, libertarian,
definition of the state - a belief that the only function of the state is to
define entitlements as between private individuals, to provide for rules
that permit and facilitate private exchange, and to provide for police and
national defence systems to protect entitlements from interference by
private individual^.^^ It follows inexorably from that definition that we
should compensate only when the state interferes with those private
entitlements.'3 That is the ideology one finds implicit in history, and it
80 It would be naive to suggest that members of Canadian society exhibit any consensus
on the legitimacy of the welfare state.
81 This idea leads to arguments against recognizing property-like entitlements in
government benefits. Rather than increasing independence from the state (the
traditional justification for recognizing private property by non-utilitarians), proponents
of the conservative position argue, that protection of such benefits increases
dependency, and represents wealth transfers from others rather than the protection
of independently created increases in wealth as do traditional judicially recognized
property rights. See S. Williams 'Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government
Benefits' (1983) 1 2 J. of k g a l Studies 3.
8 2 That is not precisely the way Robert Nozick would have put it, but it certainly captures
his ideas, and is sufficient to explain the point. See Anarchy, State and Utopia supra note
45.

83 It should be obvious that my two definitions are not meant to be exclusive; rather, they
illustrate the connection between our philosophy of government and the way we choose
to respond to compensation claims. For example, a different theory of the state might
posit that the only explanation for state action is the private return to both political and
bureaucratic decision-makers associated with their choices. This would mean that
bureaucrats would focus on compensation choices that increase their program budgets,
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is precisely what is implicit in all federal and provincial Crown liability
legislation.
We could, however, conceive of the state quite differently, '4 and take
as our starting-point the liberal idea that the state is constituted as a
political and social institution through which all individuals are able to
achieve their full potential -as defined by themselves, both as individuals
and members of a community. Further, our egalitarian ideas of the state
mean that members of the community ought to share equally in the
benefits and losses associated with social and economic development.
Finally, our vision of the state can include a role that canjustify redistribution of wealth on utilitarian grounds -an admittedly difficult empirical
calculation, but one that can justify responses to anticipated or actual losses
which focus on net increases in aggregate welfare.
Those assumptions radically transform our choices of the interests that
ought to be recognized in adjustment policies. Deciding to recognize
certain aspects of private welfare means deciding on those entitlements
which we think ought to be distributed collectively rather than through
market forces. Recognizing the redistributive role of the welfare state
means that the interests we protect are those we prefer to respect in the
light of individual need rather than demand.'5 In the end, adjustment
policies will require us to identify aspects of human well-being which we as
a community decide should be enjoyed relatively equally by all participants

bureaucratic decision-makers associated with their choices. This would mean that
bureaucrats would focus on compensation choices that increase their program budgets,
personnel, intragovernmental influence, and the effective implementation of their
programs, while legislators would focus on the compensation claims that produce votes.
In this model of the state, we should discover bureaucratically initiated adjustment
programs that 'bribe' marginal special interest actors to agree to suspend their
opposition to programs and perhaps to support programs they would otherwise
oppose, and legislatively initiated programs that 'bribe' marginal voters. It may also
justify compensation programs that serve only to silence otherwise embarrassing claims.
This thesis might explain a broad range of 'non-legal' compensation claims now
operating within the federal government. See Government Employees Compensation
Act, RSC 1970, C. G-8.
84 That is, we respond to claims that reflect desires uninfluenced by considerations of
economic trade-offs, and independent of economic considerations in general. Of
course, because the claims do not involve private costs, we face the intractable and quite
dangerous problem of claims uninhibited by the 'natural' choices that must be made
by individuals who must give up something in order to participate in exchange
relations. The point is that we can respond to these needs through non-market devices
so long as we replace the market by alternative (and probably centralized) demandconstraining devices.
85 This is the idea behind the 'rule of law' argument, which is ubiquitous in debates about
government liability, and which is usually justified by reference to 'fairness' and equal
treatment. It is not that fairness and equality are irrelevant; it is that those ideas can
be employed to generate quite different outcomes.
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in society; in a sense, we will be asking when we should assume and
undertake responsibility to respond to the needs of individuals as members
of our community.
Having said all of that, I will add that a choice to reject the current
'private' regime established in provincial and federal Crown liability
legislation need not necessarily mean rejecting 'tort' law and the court
system to resolve individual-administration conflict. Unlike the current
regime, the development of program-specificadjustment policies will take
into account the effect of the program on private markets, including
capital investment decisions and private accident reduction and insurance
responses; the availability of private market insurance which might
develop in response to the administratively generated injury; a concern
with ex post equality that responds to the impact of the injury on the firm
or individual; a concern with market solutions that discriminate on the
basis of wealth; the utilitarian advantages of loss-spreading or sharing; the
identification of the costs of adjustment policies in the sense that the
resources devoted to that end must be generated by taxation, government
borrowing, or alternative programs; our concern with individual sacrifice
that we demand for the public good; the impact of the adjustment policy
on bureaucratic activity; and the institutional mechanisms that should be
used to implement the program.
In contrast to the apparently homogeneous 'tort' system, the products
of this analysis will vary dramatically across programs. But a normative
order must be identified and created which guides our choices and
establishes the continuity in our policies that constitutes Canadian society.
We might seek this continuity by working backwards from the secondorder program-specific choices; or we might articulate the multidimensional purposes of the Canadian state, which we believe generates the
administrative policies and programs we develop. The normative order of
the Canadian state, if there is one, will produce the continuity across the
adjustment policies we develop.
But choosing to design program-specific adjustment policies only
partially addresses the seminal question I posed at the outset: should we
retain 'private' tort law and associated curial institutions to respond to
government-generated losses?We might retain tort law as a default system
that operates until the program-specific adjustment policy is developed.
Alternatively, we might retain tort law as a default system that would
continue to operate simultaneously and as an alternative to the programspecific adjustment mechanisms.
The question that is particularly problematic is whether we should
continue to employ private law and thus combine its benefits with those
generated by the program-specific adjustment mechanisms. There is
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obvious symbolic and legitimating authority in a system that treats public
bureaucrats with the same rules applied to private firms, and a system that
preserves tort law would continue to reflect that authority.86 Permitting
complainants to employ the court process may enable them to generate a
degree of debate and awareness that otherwise might be absent in a
program-specific adjustment mechanism. Complainants mightwantto be
able to employ the legal system as a component of a broader political
strategy to seek compensation and associated adjustment responses from
governments. And, as I suggested earlier, the continuation of private tort
law might be particularly appropriate if the government appears to be
engaging in activities comparable to those in which private firms engage.
The benefits associated with retaining tort law to redress public wrongs,
though not inconsiderable, are simply not enough tojustify proposals that
would retain private law ideas and the courts in the case of accidents
generated by administrative action. First, tort law, given its public and
private delivery costs, should not be conceived of as acornpensation system;
and in so far as our adjustment policy is designed to achieve that end,
retaining tort law is simply irrelevant. Second, the symbolic and public
aspects of private law can be generated through alternative institutions,
and articulated justifications and explanations for compensation or its
denial - the hallmark of the rule of law - are not monopolized by it.
Third, while the government might appear to be acting like a private firm,
there is no reason to think that it will respond to economic signals when it
is not constrained by private capital, product, and labour markets. Thus,
a primary idea behind tort law -that both actors bear the full cost of the
activity that generated the loss -is inapt when the government is one of
the actors.
Fourth, the private law regime used to define personal legal responsibility permits private actors the liberty to act in their private self-interest, and
only protects entitlements based on property ownership, contract, and
personal physical integrity. There is no reason to think that representatives
of the community ought to be subject to the same liberal ideas, and even
less reason to believe that the only responsibilities of the community
involve not depriving individuals of their property. Although virtually any
result can be obtained by using the tort system, we run the risk of
distorting a system that operates to define relations among private actors
so that it is able to respond to administrative action. Most important,

86 This is the idea behind the 'rule of law' argument, which is ubiquitous in debates about
government liability, and which is usually justified by reference to 'fairness' and equal
treatment. It is not that fairness and equality are irrelevant; it is that those ideas can
be employed to generate quite different outcomes.
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retaining tort law means that the wealth distributed through that
compensation system will be unavailable to the program-specific system,
or perhaps to other programs. I cannot see why history should compel us
to give priority to the interests respected in private law. The choices we
face in responding to government-generated losses represent enormously
difficult political choices involving competing claims to public and private
resources. Those questions cannot be answered by turning to a system
designed to define relations between individuals, and that is precisely what
tort law represents.
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